mirror of
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db4f1c0277
* httpcaddyfile: Revise automation policy generation This should fix a frustrating edge case where wildcard subjects are used, which potentially get shadowed by more specific versions of themselves; see the new tests for an example. This change is motivated by an actual customer requirement. Although all the tests pass, this logic is incredibly complex and nuanced, and I'm worried it is not correct. But it took me about 4 days to get this far on a solution. I did my best. * Fix typo
536 lines
20 KiB
Go
536 lines
20 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2015 Matthew Holt and The Caddy Authors
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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package httpcaddyfile
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"reflect"
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"sort"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2"
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"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/caddyconfig"
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"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp"
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"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddytls"
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"github.com/caddyserver/certmagic"
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"github.com/mholt/acmez/acme"
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)
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func (st ServerType) buildTLSApp(
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pairings []sbAddrAssociation,
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options map[string]interface{},
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warnings []caddyconfig.Warning,
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) (*caddytls.TLS, []caddyconfig.Warning, error) {
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tlsApp := &caddytls.TLS{CertificatesRaw: make(caddy.ModuleMap)}
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var certLoaders []caddytls.CertificateLoader
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httpsPort := strconv.Itoa(caddyhttp.DefaultHTTPSPort)
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if hsp, ok := options["https_port"].(int); ok {
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httpsPort = strconv.Itoa(hsp)
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}
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// count how many server blocks have a TLS-enabled key with
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// no host, and find all hosts that share a server block with
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// a hostless key, so that they don't get forgotten/omitted
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// by auto-HTTPS (since they won't appear in route matchers)
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var serverBlocksWithTLSHostlessKey int
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hostsSharedWithHostlessKey := make(map[string]struct{})
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for _, pair := range pairings {
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for _, sb := range pair.serverBlocks {
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for _, addr := range sb.keys {
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if addr.Host == "" {
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// this address has no hostname, but if it's explicitly set
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// to HTTPS, then we need to count it as being TLS-enabled
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if addr.Scheme == "https" || addr.Port == httpsPort {
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serverBlocksWithTLSHostlessKey++
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}
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// this server block has a hostless key, now
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// go through and add all the hosts to the set
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for _, otherAddr := range sb.keys {
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if otherAddr.Original == addr.Original {
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continue
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}
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if otherAddr.Host != "" {
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hostsSharedWithHostlessKey[otherAddr.Host] = struct{}{}
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}
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}
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break
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// a catch-all automation policy is used as a "default" for all subjects that
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// don't have custom configuration explicitly associated with them; this
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// is only to add if the global settings or defaults are non-empty
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catchAllAP, err := newBaseAutomationPolicy(options, warnings, false)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, warnings, err
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}
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if catchAllAP != nil {
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if tlsApp.Automation == nil {
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tlsApp.Automation = new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)
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}
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tlsApp.Automation.Policies = append(tlsApp.Automation.Policies, catchAllAP)
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}
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for _, p := range pairings {
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for _, sblock := range p.serverBlocks {
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// get values that populate an automation policy for this block
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ap, err := newBaseAutomationPolicy(options, warnings, true)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, warnings, err
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}
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sblockHosts := sblock.hostsFromKeys(false)
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if len(sblockHosts) == 0 && catchAllAP != nil {
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ap = catchAllAP
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}
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// on-demand tls
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if _, ok := sblock.pile["tls.on_demand"]; ok {
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ap.OnDemand = true
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}
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// certificate issuers
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if issuerVals, ok := sblock.pile["tls.cert_issuer"]; ok {
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for _, issuerVal := range issuerVals {
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issuer := issuerVal.Value.(certmagic.Issuer)
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if ap == catchAllAP && !reflect.DeepEqual(ap.Issuer, issuer) {
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return nil, warnings, fmt.Errorf("automation policy from site block is also default/catch-all policy because of key without hostname, and the two are in conflict: %#v != %#v", ap.Issuer, issuer)
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}
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ap.Issuer = issuer
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}
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}
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// custom bind host
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for _, cfgVal := range sblock.pile["bind"] {
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// if an issuer was already configured and it is NOT an ACME
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// issuer, skip, since we intend to adjust only ACME issuers
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var acmeIssuer *caddytls.ACMEIssuer
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if ap.Issuer != nil {
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// ensure we include any issuer that embeds/wraps an underlying ACME issuer
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type acmeCapable interface{ GetACMEIssuer() *caddytls.ACMEIssuer }
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if acmeWrapper, ok := ap.Issuer.(acmeCapable); ok {
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acmeIssuer = acmeWrapper.GetACMEIssuer()
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} else {
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break
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}
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}
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// proceed to configure the ACME issuer's bind host, without
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// overwriting any existing settings
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if acmeIssuer == nil {
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acmeIssuer = new(caddytls.ACMEIssuer)
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}
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if acmeIssuer.Challenges == nil {
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acmeIssuer.Challenges = new(caddytls.ChallengesConfig)
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}
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if acmeIssuer.Challenges.BindHost == "" {
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// only binding to one host is supported
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var bindHost string
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if bindHosts, ok := cfgVal.Value.([]string); ok && len(bindHosts) > 0 {
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bindHost = bindHosts[0]
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}
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acmeIssuer.Challenges.BindHost = bindHost
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}
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ap.Issuer = acmeIssuer // we'll encode it later
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}
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// first make sure this block is allowed to create an automation policy;
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// doing so is forbidden if it has a key with no host (i.e. ":443")
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// and if there is a different server block that also has a key with no
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// host -- since a key with no host matches any host, we need its
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// associated automation policy to have an empty Subjects list, i.e. no
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// host filter, which is indistinguishable between the two server blocks
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// because automation is not done in the context of a particular server...
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// this is an example of a poor mapping from Caddyfile to JSON but that's
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// the least-leaky abstraction I could figure out
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if len(sblockHosts) == 0 {
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if serverBlocksWithTLSHostlessKey > 1 {
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// this server block and at least one other has a key with no host,
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// making the two indistinguishable; it is misleading to define such
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// a policy within one server block since it actually will apply to
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// others as well
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return nil, warnings, fmt.Errorf("cannot make a TLS automation policy from a server block that has a host-less address when there are other TLS-enabled server block addresses lacking a host")
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}
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if catchAllAP == nil {
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// this server block has a key with no hosts, but there is not yet
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// a catch-all automation policy (probably because no global options
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// were set), so this one becomes it
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catchAllAP = ap
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}
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}
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// associate our new automation policy with this server block's hosts
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ap.Subjects = sblockHosts
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sort.Strings(ap.Subjects) // solely for deterministic test results
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// if a combination of public and internal names were given
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// for this same server block and no issuer was specified, we
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// need to separate them out in the automation policies so
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// that the internal names can use the internal issuer and
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// the other names can use the default/public/ACME issuer
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var ap2 *caddytls.AutomationPolicy
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if ap.Issuer == nil {
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var internal, external []string
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for _, s := range ap.Subjects {
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if !certmagic.SubjectQualifiesForCert(s) {
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return nil, warnings, fmt.Errorf("subject does not qualify for certificate: '%s'", s)
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}
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// we don't use certmagic.SubjectQualifiesForPublicCert() because of one nuance:
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// names like *.*.tld that may not qualify for a public certificate are actually
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// fine when used with OnDemand, since OnDemand (currently) does not obtain
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// wildcards (if it ever does, there will be a separate config option to enable
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// it that we would need to check here) since the hostname is known at handshake;
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// and it is unexpected to switch to internal issuer when the user wants to get
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// regular certificates on-demand for a class of certs like *.*.tld.
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if !certmagic.SubjectIsIP(s) && !certmagic.SubjectIsInternal(s) && (strings.Count(s, "*.") < 2 || ap.OnDemand) {
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external = append(external, s)
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} else {
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internal = append(internal, s)
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}
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}
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if len(external) > 0 && len(internal) > 0 {
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ap.Subjects = external
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apCopy := *ap
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ap2 = &apCopy
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ap2.Subjects = internal
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ap2.IssuerRaw = caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject(caddytls.InternalIssuer{}, "module", "internal", &warnings)
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}
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}
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if tlsApp.Automation == nil {
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tlsApp.Automation = new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)
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}
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tlsApp.Automation.Policies = append(tlsApp.Automation.Policies, ap)
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if ap2 != nil {
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tlsApp.Automation.Policies = append(tlsApp.Automation.Policies, ap2)
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}
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// certificate loaders
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if clVals, ok := sblock.pile["tls.cert_loader"]; ok {
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for _, clVal := range clVals {
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certLoaders = append(certLoaders, clVal.Value.(caddytls.CertificateLoader))
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// group certificate loaders by module name, then add to config
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if len(certLoaders) > 0 {
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loadersByName := make(map[string]caddytls.CertificateLoader)
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for _, cl := range certLoaders {
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name := caddy.GetModuleName(cl)
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// ugh... technically, we may have multiple FileLoader and FolderLoader
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// modules (because the tls directive returns one per occurrence), but
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// the config structure expects only one instance of each kind of loader
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// module, so we have to combine them... instead of enumerating each
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// possible cert loader module in a type switch, we can use reflection,
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// which works on any cert loaders that are slice types
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if reflect.TypeOf(cl).Kind() == reflect.Slice {
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combined := reflect.ValueOf(loadersByName[name])
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if !combined.IsValid() {
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combined = reflect.New(reflect.TypeOf(cl)).Elem()
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}
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clVal := reflect.ValueOf(cl)
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for i := 0; i < clVal.Len(); i++ {
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combined = reflect.Append(combined, clVal.Index(i))
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}
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loadersByName[name] = combined.Interface().(caddytls.CertificateLoader)
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}
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}
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for certLoaderName, loaders := range loadersByName {
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tlsApp.CertificatesRaw[certLoaderName] = caddyconfig.JSON(loaders, &warnings)
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}
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}
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// set any of the on-demand options, for if/when on-demand TLS is enabled
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if onDemand, ok := options["on_demand_tls"].(*caddytls.OnDemandConfig); ok {
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if tlsApp.Automation == nil {
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tlsApp.Automation = new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)
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}
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tlsApp.Automation.OnDemand = onDemand
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}
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// if any hostnames appear on the same server block as a key with
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// no host, they will not be used with route matchers because the
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// hostless key matches all hosts, therefore, it wouldn't be
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// considered for auto-HTTPS, so we need to make sure those hosts
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// are manually considered for managed certificates; we also need
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// to make sure that any of these names which are internal-only
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// get internal certificates by default rather than ACME
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var al caddytls.AutomateLoader
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internalAP := &caddytls.AutomationPolicy{
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IssuerRaw: json.RawMessage(`{"module":"internal"}`),
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}
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for h := range hostsSharedWithHostlessKey {
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al = append(al, h)
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if !certmagic.SubjectQualifiesForPublicCert(h) {
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internalAP.Subjects = append(internalAP.Subjects, h)
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}
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}
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if len(al) > 0 {
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tlsApp.CertificatesRaw["automate"] = caddyconfig.JSON(al, &warnings)
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}
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if len(internalAP.Subjects) > 0 {
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if tlsApp.Automation == nil {
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tlsApp.Automation = new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)
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}
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tlsApp.Automation.Policies = append(tlsApp.Automation.Policies, internalAP)
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}
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// finalize and verify policies; do cleanup
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if tlsApp.Automation != nil {
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// encode any issuer values we created, so they will be rendered in the output
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for _, ap := range tlsApp.Automation.Policies {
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if ap.Issuer != nil && ap.IssuerRaw == nil {
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// encode issuer now that it's all set up
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issuerName := ap.Issuer.(caddy.Module).CaddyModule().ID.Name()
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ap.IssuerRaw = caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject(ap.Issuer, "module", issuerName, &warnings)
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}
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}
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// consolidate automation policies that are the exact same
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tlsApp.Automation.Policies = consolidateAutomationPolicies(tlsApp.Automation.Policies)
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// ensure automation policies don't overlap subjects (this should be
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// an error at provision-time as well, but catch it in the adapt phase
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// for convenience)
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automationHostSet := make(map[string]struct{})
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for _, ap := range tlsApp.Automation.Policies {
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for _, s := range ap.Subjects {
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if _, ok := automationHostSet[s]; ok {
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return nil, warnings, fmt.Errorf("hostname appears in more than one automation policy, making certificate management ambiguous: %s", s)
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}
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automationHostSet[s] = struct{}{}
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}
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}
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// if nothing remains, remove any excess values to clean up the resulting config
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if len(tlsApp.Automation.Policies) == 0 {
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tlsApp.Automation.Policies = nil
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}
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if reflect.DeepEqual(tlsApp.Automation, new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)) {
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tlsApp.Automation = nil
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}
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}
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return tlsApp, warnings, nil
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}
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// newBaseAutomationPolicy returns a new TLS automation policy that gets
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// its values from the global options map. It should be used as the base
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// for any other automation policies. A nil policy (and no error) will be
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// returned if there are no default/global options. However, if always is
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// true, a non-nil value will always be returned (unless there is an error).
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func newBaseAutomationPolicy(options map[string]interface{}, warnings []caddyconfig.Warning, always bool) (*caddytls.AutomationPolicy, error) {
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issuer, hasIssuer := options["cert_issuer"]
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acmeCA, hasACMECA := options["acme_ca"]
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acmeCARoot, hasACMECARoot := options["acme_ca_root"]
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acmeDNS, hasACMEDNS := options["acme_dns"]
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acmeEAB, hasACMEEAB := options["acme_eab"]
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email, hasEmail := options["email"]
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localCerts, hasLocalCerts := options["local_certs"]
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keyType, hasKeyType := options["key_type"]
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hasGlobalAutomationOpts := hasIssuer || hasACMECA || hasACMECARoot || hasACMEDNS || hasACMEEAB || hasEmail || hasLocalCerts || hasKeyType
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// if there are no global options related to automation policies
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// set, then we can just return right away
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if !hasGlobalAutomationOpts {
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if always {
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return new(caddytls.AutomationPolicy), nil
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}
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return nil, nil
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}
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ap := new(caddytls.AutomationPolicy)
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if keyType != nil {
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ap.KeyType = keyType.(string)
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}
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if hasIssuer {
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if hasACMECA || hasACMEDNS || hasACMEEAB || hasEmail || hasLocalCerts {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("global options are ambiguous: cert_issuer is confusing when combined with acme_*, email, or local_certs options")
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}
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ap.Issuer = issuer.(certmagic.Issuer)
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} else if localCerts != nil {
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// internal issuer enabled trumps any ACME configurations; useful in testing
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ap.Issuer = new(caddytls.InternalIssuer) // we'll encode it later
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} else {
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if acmeCA == nil {
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acmeCA = ""
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}
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if email == nil {
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email = ""
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}
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mgr := &caddytls.ACMEIssuer{
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CA: acmeCA.(string),
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Email: email.(string),
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}
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if acmeDNS != nil {
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provName := acmeDNS.(string)
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dnsProvModule, err := caddy.GetModule("dns.providers." + provName)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("getting DNS provider module named '%s': %v", provName, err)
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}
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mgr.Challenges = &caddytls.ChallengesConfig{
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DNS: &caddytls.DNSChallengeConfig{
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ProviderRaw: caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject(dnsProvModule.New(), "name", provName, &warnings),
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},
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}
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}
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if acmeCARoot != nil {
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mgr.TrustedRootsPEMFiles = []string{acmeCARoot.(string)}
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}
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if acmeEAB != nil {
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mgr.ExternalAccount = acmeEAB.(*acme.EAB)
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}
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ap.Issuer = disambiguateACMEIssuer(mgr) // we'll encode it later
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}
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return ap, nil
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}
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// disambiguateACMEIssuer returns an issuer based on the properties of acmeIssuer.
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// If acmeIssuer implicitly configures a certain kind of ACMEIssuer (for example,
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// ZeroSSL), the proper wrapper over acmeIssuer will be returned instead.
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func disambiguateACMEIssuer(acmeIssuer *caddytls.ACMEIssuer) certmagic.Issuer {
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// as a special case, we integrate with ZeroSSL's ACME endpoint if it looks like an
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// implicit ZeroSSL configuration (this requires a wrapper type over ACMEIssuer
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// because of the EAB generation; if EAB is provided, we can use plain ACMEIssuer)
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if strings.Contains(acmeIssuer.CA, "acme.zerossl.com") && acmeIssuer.ExternalAccount == nil {
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return &caddytls.ZeroSSLIssuer{ACMEIssuer: acmeIssuer}
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}
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return acmeIssuer
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}
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// consolidateAutomationPolicies combines automation policies that are the same,
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// for a cleaner overall output.
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func consolidateAutomationPolicies(aps []*caddytls.AutomationPolicy) []*caddytls.AutomationPolicy {
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// sort from most specific to least specific; we depend on this ordering
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sort.SliceStable(aps, func(i, j int) bool {
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if automationPolicyIsSubset(aps[i], aps[j]) {
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return true
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}
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if automationPolicyIsSubset(aps[j], aps[i]) {
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return false
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}
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return len(aps[i].Subjects) > len(aps[j].Subjects)
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})
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// remove any empty policies (except subjects, of course)
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emptyAP := new(caddytls.AutomationPolicy)
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for i := 0; i < len(aps); i++ {
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emptyAP.Subjects = aps[i].Subjects
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if reflect.DeepEqual(aps[i], emptyAP) {
|
|
aps = append(aps[:i], aps[i+1:]...)
|
|
i--
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// remove or combine duplicate policies
|
|
for i := 0; i < len(aps); i++ {
|
|
for j := i + 1; j < len(aps); j++ {
|
|
// if they're exactly equal in every way, just keep one of them
|
|
if reflect.DeepEqual(aps[i], aps[j]) {
|
|
aps = append(aps[:j], aps[j+1:]...)
|
|
i--
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// if the policy is the same, we can keep just one, but we have
|
|
// to be careful which one we keep; if only one has any hostnames
|
|
// defined, then we need to keep the one without any hostnames,
|
|
// otherwise the one without any subjects (a catch-all) would be
|
|
// eaten up by the one with subjects; and if both have subjects, we
|
|
// need to combine their lists
|
|
if bytes.Equal(aps[i].IssuerRaw, aps[j].IssuerRaw) &&
|
|
bytes.Equal(aps[i].StorageRaw, aps[j].StorageRaw) &&
|
|
aps[i].MustStaple == aps[j].MustStaple &&
|
|
aps[i].KeyType == aps[j].KeyType &&
|
|
aps[i].OnDemand == aps[j].OnDemand &&
|
|
aps[i].RenewalWindowRatio == aps[j].RenewalWindowRatio {
|
|
if len(aps[i].Subjects) > 0 && len(aps[j].Subjects) == 0 {
|
|
// later policy (at j) has no subjects ("catch-all"), so we can
|
|
// remove the identical-but-more-specific policy that comes first
|
|
// AS LONG AS it is not shadowed by another policy before it; e.g.
|
|
// if policy i is for example.com, policy i+1 is '*.com', and policy
|
|
// j is catch-all, we cannot remove policy i because that would
|
|
// cause example.com to be served by the less specific policy for
|
|
// '*.com', which might be different (yes we've seen this happen)
|
|
if automationPolicyShadows(i, aps) >= j {
|
|
aps = append(aps[:i], aps[i+1:]...)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// avoid repeated subjects
|
|
for _, subj := range aps[j].Subjects {
|
|
if !sliceContains(aps[i].Subjects, subj) {
|
|
aps[i].Subjects = append(aps[i].Subjects, subj)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
aps = append(aps[:j], aps[j+1:]...)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return aps
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// automationPolicyIsSubset returns true if a's subjects are a subset
|
|
// of b's subjects.
|
|
func automationPolicyIsSubset(a, b *caddytls.AutomationPolicy) bool {
|
|
if len(b.Subjects) == 0 {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if len(a.Subjects) == 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
for _, aSubj := range a.Subjects {
|
|
var inSuperset bool
|
|
for _, bSubj := range b.Subjects {
|
|
if certmagic.MatchWildcard(aSubj, bSubj) {
|
|
inSuperset = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !inSuperset {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// automationPolicyShadows returns the index of a policy that aps[i] shadows;
|
|
// in other words, for all policies after position i, if that policy covers
|
|
// the same subjects but is less specific, that policy's position is returned,
|
|
// or -1 if no shadowing is found. For example, if policy i is for
|
|
// "foo.example.com" and policy i+2 is for "*.example.com", then i+2 will be
|
|
// returned, since that policy is shadowed by i, which is in front.
|
|
func automationPolicyShadows(i int, aps []*caddytls.AutomationPolicy) int {
|
|
for j := i + 1; j < len(aps); j++ {
|
|
if automationPolicyIsSubset(aps[i], aps[j]) {
|
|
return j
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return -1
|
|
}
|